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Every tweet counts? How sentiment
analysis of social networks can improve
our knowledge of citizens’ policy
preferences. An application to Italy and
France
Abstract
The growing usage of social media by a wider audience of citizens sharply
increases the possibility to investigate the web as a device to explore and track
policy preferences. In the present paper we apply the recent method proposed in
Hopkins and King (2010) to three di↵erent scenarios, by analyzing on one side
the on-line popularity of Italian political leaders throughout 2011, and on the
other the voting intention of French internet-users in both the 2012 Presidential
ballot and in the subsequent Legislative election. Despite internet users are
not necessarily representative of the whole population of country’s citizens, our
analysis shows a remarkable ability of social-media to forecast electoral results
as well as a noteworthy correlation between social-media and traditional mass
surveys results. We also illustrate that the predictive ability of social-media
analysis strengthens as the number of citizens’ expressing on-line their opinion
increases, provided they act consistently on that (i.e. apart from high abstention
rates).
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Abstract  
 
The growing usage of social media by a wider audience of citizens sharply increases the 
possibility to investigate the web as a device to explore and track policy preferences. In the 
present paper we apply the recent method proposed in Hopkins and King (2010) to three 
different scenarios, by analyzing on one side the on-line popularity of Italian political leaders 
throughout 2011, and on the other the voting intention of French internet-users in both the 2012 
Presidential ballot and in the subsequent Legislative election. Despite internet users are not 
necessarily representative of the whole population of country’s citizens, our analysis shows a 
remarkable ability of social-media to forecast electoral results as well as a noteworthy 
correlation between social-media and traditional mass surveys results. We also illustrate that the 
predictive ability of social-media analysis strengthens as the number of citizens’ expressing on-
line their opinion increases, provided they act consistently on that (i.e. apart from high 
abstention rates). 
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Introduction 
 
 The exponential growth of social media and social networks, like Facebook and Twitter, 
raises the possibility to delve into the web to explore and track the (policy) preferences of 
citizens. Internet in fact represents a valuable source of data useful to monitor public opinion 
(Madge et al., 2009; Woodly, 2007) and thanks to the recent developments of quantitative text 
analysis and “sentiment analysis” (SA) we are now in a better position to exploit such 
information in a reliable manner. 
As a matter of fact, scholars have recently started to explore social media as a device to 
forecast the elections (Tjong and Bos, 2012), to assess the popularity of politicians (Gloor et al., 
2009), or to compare the citizens’ political preferences expressed on-line with those caught by 
traditional polls (O’Connor et al., 2010). Some of these works rely on very simple techniques, 
focusing on the volume of data related to parties or candidates. For instance, Véronis (2007) 
proved that the simple number of candidate mentions in blog posts is a good predictor of 
electoral success and can perform better than election polls. Along the same line, some scholars 
claimed that the number of Facebook supporters could be a valid indicator of electoral fortunes 
(Upton, 2010; Williams and Gulati, 2008), while Tumasjan et al. (2010) compared party 
mentions on Twitter with the results of the 2009 German election and argued that the relative 
number of tweets related to each party is once again a good predictor for its vote share. 
Still not all enquiries succeeded in correctly predicting the outcome of the elections 
(Gayo-Avello et al., 2011; Goldstein and Rainey, 2010). For instance, it has been shown that the 
share of campaign weblogs prior to the 2005 federal election in Germany was not a good 
predictor of the relative strength of the parties insofar as small parties were overrepresented 
(Albrecht et al., 2007). In a study about Canadian elections, Jansen and Koop (2005) failed in 
estimating the positions of the two largest parties. Gayo-Avello (2011) proved that social media 
analysts would have overestimated Obama’s victory in 2008 (up to the point of predicting his 
success even in Texas). Finally, Jungherr et al. (2011) criticized the work of Tumasjan et al. 
(2010) arguing that it does not satisfy the “freedom from irrelevant alternatives” condition (e.g., 
including the German Pirate Party into the analysis would have had yielded a negative effect on 
accuracy of the predictions). 
It has been also noted that the mere count of mentions or tweets is not sufficient to 
provide an accurate foresight (Chung and Mustafaraj, 2011). Accordingly, other studies tried to 
improve this stream of research by means of sentiment analysis.1 Lindsay (2008), for example, 
built a sentiment classifier based on lexical induction and found correlations between several 
polls conducted during the 2008 presidential election and the content of wall posts available on 
Facebook. O’Connor et al. (2010) show similar results displaying correlation between Obama’s 
approval rate and the sentiment expressed by Twitter users. In addition, sentiment analysis of 
tweets proved to perform as well as polls in predicting the results of 2011 Dutch Senate Election 
(Tjong Kim Sang and Bos, 2012), while the analysis of multiple social media (Facebook, 
Twitter, Google and YouTube) was able to outperform traditional surveys in estimating the 
results of the 2010 UK Election (Franch, 2012). 
In the present paper we follow this latter route by adopting the method proposed in 
Hopkins and King (2010) (HK, from now on). As we will discuss, this method presents various 
advantages compared to traditional SA techniques. We will employ it in three different 
scenarios, by tracking on one side the on-line popularity of Italian political leaders throughout 
2011, and, on the other side, the voting intention of French internet-users in both the 2012 
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Presidential ballot and in the subsequent Legislative election. In all cases we will contrast our 
results with the ones obtained through traditional off-line surveys as well as to actual electoral 
results.  
The variety of contexts so analyzed has been deliberately pursued to better investigate the 
strength and the limits of monitoring social networks, as well as to assess which factors can 
increase (or decrease) their reliability. In the conclusion we advance some suggestions for future 
research. 
 
1. How to scrutinize citizens’ preferences through social-media: a novel method (and 
some pros and cons) 
 
Nowadays, Internet access is available to a wider audience of citizens (and voters). In 
turn, the usage of social media is growing at very fast rates. Around 35 people out of 100 got 
access to the web, all over the world, in 2011 (approximately 2.5 billion people).2 Among them, 
72% of the internet population is active on at least one social network,3 like Facebook (over 800 
million of users, 12% of the world population)4 or Twitter (140 million of active users).5 
This is by itself a good reason to recall the importance of analyzing social media, albeit 
by far not the only one. Recently, social network have started to wield substantive effects on real 
world politics: they have been used to organize demonstrations and revolts, for instance during 
the ‘Arab spring’ (Ghannam, 2011)6; to build social movements and political parties, like the 
Pirate Party in Sweden and Germany or the Italian ‘Movimento 5 Stelle’, which use the web to 
set the party line and to select candidates.7 Social media are also often adopted to present 
petitions and to complain against politicians’ decisions. In Italy, for example, the importance of 
the opinions expressed on-line has been recognized by the Monti cabinet, who explicitly invited 
Italian citizens to provide suggestions through web on two topics: the spending review8 and the 
legal value of the university degree.9 
Given the wide amount of data about public opinion available on-line (and its growing 
relevance), monitoring this flow of preferences becomes therefore an important task per-se.10 
The problem is to select the kind of method more appropriate in this regard. While earlier 
studies, as already discussed, focused mainly on the volume of data (related, for instance, to each 
party or candidate), here we aim to catch the attitude of internet users going beyond the mere 
number of mentions. To this aim we will employ the method recently proposed in Hopkins and 
King (2010). The main advantage of the HK method is that it allows to perform a supervised and 
automated sentiment analysis. Such analysis is based on a two stage process. The first step 
involves human coders and consists in coding a subsample of the documents downloaded from 
some Internet source. This subsample represents a training set that will be used by the HK 
algorithm to classify all the unread documents, in the second stage. This method allows to 
overcome one of the major problems of the ‘old fashioned’ SA based on ontological dictionaries, 
that is the fact that they tend to misclassify posts that do not adopt a straightforward language. 
On the contrary, human coders can be more precise during such stage (Hopkins and King, 
2012).11 Then, the automated statistical analysis provided by the HK algorithm extends such 
accuracy to the whole population of posts allowing to properly catch the opinions expressed on 
the web. Indeed, the expected error of the estimate is around 3%.12 
The methodology is based on the assumption that the opinion of people posting on social 
networks can be deduced by all the terms they use: not only the terms explicitly related to the 
topic they talk about, but also the “neutral” part of the language commonly used. Therefore, in 
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order to characterize the different opinions, the single units (blogs, posts) in the data set are 
decomposed into single words: consequently, each unit is represented by the vector of the terms 
used. 
The formal background of the method is simple (for further details see: Hopkins and 
King, 2010). Indicate by S the word profiles used in the text units and by D the opinions 
expressed by people posting the texts. The frequency distribution of the terms P(S) can be 
expressed as: 
 
(*)          P(S) = P(S|D) P(D), where P(D) is the frequency distribution of the opinions. 
 
The aim of the method is to get an estimate of P(D), i.e. to know how the opinion is 
distributed over the posting population. The frequency distribution P(S) can be evaluated 
tabulating all the texts posted, and it requires only some computer time and no debatable 
assumption. The conditional distribution P(S|D) cannot be observed, and must be estimated by 
the hand-coding of the training set of texts. 
The hand-coding of the training text, in fact, allows for calculating PT(S|D), i.e. the 
conditional frequency distribution of word profiles inside the training set. The assumption – and 
the reasonable requirement – of the method is that the texts of the training set are homogeneous 
to the whole data set, i.e. they come from the same “world” the rest of the dataset comes, such 
that one can assume that: 
 
PT(S|D) = P(S|D) 
 
If this is the case, the frequency distribution of the opinions can be consistently estimated, 
because both P(S) and PT(S|D) are observable. Therefore, by equation (*) and noticing that 
PT(S|D) and P(S|D) are both matrixes, we have 
 
P(D) = P(S|D)-1 P(S) = PT(S|D)-1 P(S) 
 
where PT(S|D)-1 is the inverse matrix of PT(S|D), similarly for P(S|D)-1. 
It is worth remarking that – while the homogeneity of the training set to the dataset is 
required – no statistical property must be satisfied by the set: in particular, the training set is not 
a representative sample of the population of texts.13 
Broadly speaking, there are several social-media that could be analyzed. Here we will 
focus on Twitter, a social network for microblogging (Jansen et al., 2009) that experienced a 
sharply growth in the last months. Twitter is today the third-highest-ranking social network, 
behind Facebook and MySpace, whereas it ranked twenty-second in 2009. When we come to the 
countries analyzed in this work, we observe that in June 2011 Twitter was the second ranking in 
France and the third most-used social network in Italy. In particular, in February-March 2012, 12 
millions of Italian users were active on Twitter, approximately 20% of the Italian population 
(Mazzoleni et al., 2011). Among them one out of three (6% of the whole population) released 
political comments and opinions.14 A further crucial advantage of Twitter, that makes it so 
popular in the literature on social-media analysis, is that all the posts by users (“tweets” in the 
Twitter jargon) can be freely accessible, contrary to other social-networks.  
To download the data employed in the present paper we have relied on two sources: the 
social media monitoring and analytics platform  Crimson Hexagon 
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(http://www.crimsonhexagon.com/) and the Internet engine Voices from the Blogs 
(http://www.voicesfromtheblogs.com/).15 For the Italian case the analysis of the tweets have been 
performed using directly the ForSight platform provided by Crimson Hexagon, while for the 
French two cases the data have been collected through Voices from the Blogs and the analysis 
have been then run in R.16  
Compared to traditional survey polls, running an analysis on social-media is attractive for 
a number of reasons (Xin et al., 2010). First of all, social-media analysis is cheaper and faster 
compared to traditional surveys while enabling to continuously monitor public opinion 
performing a real time analysis (as well as to run, eventually, a retrospective analysis, by getting 
the opinion when it was actually expressed). On the contrary, off-line surveys are by definition 
more static. This feature ends up being very relevant during the electoral campaigns, as we will 
discuss below. In fact, thanks to SA, we can measure voters’ attitude day-by-day (at the extreme, 
also hour-by-hour). Hence we are able to catch the reaction of public opinion to any exogenous 
stimulus by observing the shift in preferences measured immediately after the shock. Along the 
same vein, analyzing social-media also allows to observe trends and breaking-points. This 
feature can have obvious implications for both researchers and spin doctors. Scholars can benefit 
from such amount of information to investigate preferences in-the-making, while analysts and 
advisors can exploit these data to adjust the frame of the electoral campaign.  
In addition, traditional surveys pose solicited questions and it is well known this might 
inflate the share of strategic answers (Payne, 1951). Conversely SA does not make use of 
questionnaires and just focus on listening to the stream of unsolicited opinions freely expressed 
on internet. In other words it adopts a bottom-up approach, at least if compared with the more 
traditional top-down approach of off-line surveys. Far from saying that all the comments posted 
on social networks contain the sincere preference of the author, it has been however often 
underlined that Internet represents to a large extent a public sphere where the debate is uncoerced 
by any established political agenda because users are free to express themselves (Savigny, 
2002).17 In this vein, social network should be in the position to be less affected by the spiral of 
silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974),18 or at least as biases as traditional polls. In fact, while web-
analysis has to deal with the problem of silent users, surveys face the problem of low response 
rate. 
The main weakness usually advanced when talking about social-media analysis is related 
to the riddle of being the “universe” so analyzed representative or not of the whole population. 
Indeed, although the number of users is strikingly growing, the socio-economic traits of citizens 
who have access to the web do not exactly match the actual demographics of the whole 
population of citizens and voters (Tjong Kim Sang and Bos, 2012): for example, previous studies 
show that senior citizens are underrepresented on the web (Fox 2010) and there is a prevalence 
of highly educated male individuals (Wei and Hindman, 2011).19 Interestingly, the social-
demographic differences are lowered when considering only the sample of people who release 
political opinions on-line (on this point, see also: Bakker and de Vreese, 2011).20 Along this 
vein, Best and Krueger (2005: 204, italic added) underline that ‘although online participators 
currently skew in a liberal direction, the online environment, at least compared to the offline 
environment, only marginally advantages the political voice of liberals’. On the other side, a 
review of queries related to the Italian case revealed that right-wing citizens are 
underrepresented, while the share of left-leaning people that are active on-line is greater. The 
same happens for certain geographical areas (the South) compared to others (the North-East) 
(source: ISPO, Istituto per gli Studi sulla Opinione Pubblica). Finally, other studies claimed that 
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different rates of internet availability do not wield strong effects on the electoral outcomes. Falck 
et al. (2012) found that an increase in the availability of DSL connection tend to decrease voter 
turnout, while it does not systematically benefit single parties. It only plays a negligible negative 
effect on the share of votes won by right-wing parties wielding no effect on the electoral fortunes 
of the left. 
Summing up, although the social network population, so far, is not representative of one 
country’s citizenry, there are still some doubts about whether such bias could affect the 
predictive skills of social network analysis compared to traditional off-line surveys. Indeed, the 
former aspect (the predictive skills of social-media analysis) does not necessarily need the 
previous factor (i.e., the issue of representation) to hold true to effectively apply. This can 
happen, for example, if we assume that political active internet users act like opinion-makers that 
are able to influence (or to “anticipate” as an all) the preferences of a wider audience: as a result, 
it could happen that the preferences expressed through social medias today will affect (predict) 
the opinion of the whole population tomorrow (O’Connor et al., 2010). 
In the next sections we will test the predictive skills of social media analysis by 
employing the HK method in two different countries (Italy and France) and over three 
distinguished political phenomena: leaders popularity, Presidential and Legislative national 
elections. 
 
2. Comparing Italian leaders’ popularity ratings in 2011 
  
The first political context in which exploring the usefulness (and the reliability) of a social-media 
analysis concerns the relationship between the popularity ratings of the main Italian political 
leaders throughout 2011 as they arise from traditional Mass-Surveys (source: ISPO, Istituto per 
gli Studi sulla Opinione Pubblica) and from the analysis of social-media posts. We treat in this 
sense the former surveys as our benchmark, and we control how much the latter approach them. 
The Mass-Surveys popularity ratings go from 13 January 2011 to 20 October 2011, and 
they focus on seven leaders: Silvio Berlusconi (leader of PDL and Italian Prime Minister at that 
time), Pier Luigi Bersani (leader of PD, main opposition party), Umberto Bossi (leader of 
Northern League and main cabinet partner of PDL at that time), Pier Ferdinando Casini (leader 
of the centrist party UDC, opposition party), Antonio Di Pietro (leader of IDV, opposition party), 
Gianfranco Fini (President of the Italian Lower Chamber and co-founder of PDL, before leaving 
the party at the end of 2011), and Nichi Vendola (leader of the radical-left party SEL, the main 
extra-parliamentary opposition party). The popularity ratings ranges from 0 to 100 and identify 
the percentage of positive scores given by the respondents to each leader. 
Similarly, the popularity of each leader from social media has been estimated as the 
percentage of his positive posts over the sum of his positive and negative posted, and once again 
ranges from 0 to 100 to make it comparable to the survey popularity ratings. We considered two 
different temporal range: in the first case, we collected all the posts concerning each leader in the 
month preceding the day in which the Mass-Survey was actually administered. In the second 
case, we rerun the above procedure considering just the week preceding the day in which the 
Mass-Survey was administered. Overall, we have analyzed over 107,000 tweets if we consider 
the monthly timing (32,000 tweets in the weekly timing). Given that the results of our analysis 
look remarkably similar regardless of the time-period considered when analyzing social-media, 
we focus here on the popularity scores that arise from a weekly-timing (following the choice 
made by Tjong Kim Sang and Bos, 2012). 
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In Table 1 below we report the average difference (Mass-Surveys minus Social-Media 
popularity ratings) of the scores so obtained. Three main findings clearly arise from the Table. 
First, as long as we consider all leaders without any internal distinction, the average Mass-
Surveys ratings appear to be always higher than social-media ones (on average by more than five 
points). This is true for all the leaders, except Di Pietro and Fini whose on-line popularity 
appears to be higher. Second, we find a considerable variation among leaders: for example, the 
average difference between the two measure of ratings is quite low for both Bossi and Fini 
(albeit with a different sign in the two cases), while it increases considerably for Casini, Bersani 
and Vendola. Third, the correlation between Mass-Surveys and social-media ratings is positive, 
albeit not dramatically strong. Note, however, a marked contrast between, on one side 
Berlusconi, Bersani and Bossi (that is, the three most important and visible Italian leaders during 
2011) and on the other all the remaining leaders. For our first set of leaders the correlation is 
indeed considerably higher, particularly for Berlusconi (r = .93) and Bersani (r = .75). 
 
Table 1. Average difference and correlation of leaders' popularity ratings between Mass-
Surveys and Social-media. Here “n” is the number of mass surveys for each leader. 
  avg. difference st.dev. R n 
All leaders         
- % positive-posts (previous week) 5.71 .497 .241 43 
Berlusconi         
- % positive-posts (previous week) 8.71 1.89 .933 7 
Bersani         
- % positive-posts (previous week) 12.53 1.40 .746 6 
Bossi         
- % positive-posts (previous week) 2.58 2.54 .540 6 
Casini         
- % positive-posts (previous week) 13.34 2.92 -.008 5 
Di Pietro         
- % positive-posts (previous week) -4.12 1.97 .109 6 
Fini         
- % positive-posts (previous week) -2.30 2.93 .005 7 
Vendola         
- % positive-posts (previous week) 10.32 2.14 .090 6 
  
 
The previous Table gives us however just an aggregate (and static) picture that 
summarizes all the temporal observations. Therefore, it cannot tell us anything related to the 
dynamic relationship between our two measures of popularity ratings. To explore this issue, 
Figure 1 below plots the evolution over time of the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) of the 
predictions on leaders popularity as they arise from social-media as compared to the scores 
obtained from Mass-surveys. The MAE has been indeed widely used to compare the accuracy of 
forecast based on social network analysis (Tumasjan et al., 2010) and that of political 
information markets relative to election polls (Huber and Hauser, 2005). This is what we do here 
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as well. As can be seen, despite being quite relevant at the beginning of 2011 (around 13 points), 
this absolute difference tends to markedly decrease as times goes by. 21 
 
Figure 1. The MAE of leaders' popularity ratings between Mass-Surveys and Social-media 
estimation over time  
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To sum up, albeit being just an exploratory analysis, our results provide some quite 
interesting insights:  
• At least for the most visible leaders, the two measures of popularity ratings (Mass-
Surveys and social-media) seem to go hand-by-hand, that is, they appear to react in the 
same way to exogenous factors (i.e., news reported in the media concerning particular 
leaders, political events, etc.). When the first measure increases, so it happens also with 
the second one and vice versa.  
• Mass-Surveys are on average more “generous” than social-media with respect to 
popularity ratings (i.e., they generally give a higher rating to political leaders). However, 
the (absolute) average difference between the two measure of popularity ratings – at least 
during 2011 – seems to be clearly declining over time.  
In this last respect, it is worth noting that the possibility of new elections was a widely debate 
(and a real possibility) during the second part of 2011 in the Italian political debate throughout 
the political crisis of the Berlusconi IV cabinet.22 In this sense, it could be argued that as the 
shadow of an election approaches, more people tend to express their opinions on politics within 
social media (and indeed the number of tweets about Italian political leaders more than doubled 
on average since May 2011: see Figure 1). This, on the other side, could turn social media to be 
able to better approximate the opinion of the general public. Albeit quite speculative, this 
conclusion, by its own, should be a good news for the electoral forecasting ability of a social-
media analysis. The next two sections are devoted to explore precisely this latter possibility. 
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3. Electoral campaign and social media (1): the 2012 French presidential ballot 
  
In our second example, we take an even more dynamic approach than in the previous 
case. By focusing on the second round of the 2012 French Presidential elections held on 6 May 
2012, when Sarkozy and Hollande fought their final struggle, we test whether the analysis of 
social media can be a device to forecast the actual results of the elections, comparing our results 
with those provided by traditional survey polls. Secondly, we show the (unique) possibility that a 
social-media analysis allows to do, that is, the chance to monitor day-by-day the flow of 
preferences of internet users as expressed by their tweets and their (close) connection with the 
on-going political agenda and electoral campaign. 
For this purpose we collected 244,000 tweets, posted between April 27th and May 5th. At 
the polls Hollande won the ballot against Sarkozy with 51.64% of total votes. According to the 
opinions expressed on-line we foresaw similarly a victory for the socialist candidate, Hollande, 
with the 54.9% of votes. Even considering the maximum error attached to our technique 
(discussed earlier) we are therefore able to correctly predict the outcome. Our prediction 
moreover is in line with those made by survey companies, who assigned to Hollande a share of 
votes ranging between 52% and 53.5% in the last published surveys.23 Our estimate was also 
analogous to the prediction (53.2%) made by academic scholars (Nedeau et al., 2012).  
As already mentioned, instead of running a unique analysis, during the run-off we 
continuously monitored the flow of preferences, day-by-day. We ran eight daily analysis to 
check how the expression of preferences has changed over time, in reply to the news related to 
the electoral campaign. Figure 2 displays the daily monitor of voting preferences. Hollande was 
almost always leading though with a narrow margin. However the flow is not always straight and 
it highlights some peaks and turning points that could be explained in the light of electoral 
campaign agenda. 
 
Figure 2. Flow of preferences expressed on Twitter during the electoral campaign for the second 
round of 2012 French Presidential election 
 
 
 
10 
 
First of all, on 28 April 2012 we found a peak in favor of Hollande. In those days Sarkozy 
was dealing with a document that seemed to attest that his electoral campaign in 2007 was 
founded by the former ruler of Lybia Muammar Gaddafi. On the same days another scandal 
involved the incumbent candidate: a piece of news reported by the medias claimed that the 
popular socialist politician Dominique Strauss-Khan (DSK), a strong opponent of Sarkozy, has 
been illegally spied by the French Secret Service. These elements had an echo on-line and 
contributed to a growth of support for Sarkozy’s opponent, Hollande. 
Conversely, in the following days (29 and 30 April 2012) a former member of the Libyan 
regime denied any suspicion about illegal funding in favor of Sarkozy, who in turn blamed the 
medias for reporting fake news. In addition DSK, who was involved in a sex scandal few months 
before the elections, entered into the campaign and took part to a fund-raising dinner organized 
by members of the Socialist Party. In consequence of these events Sarkozy was able to gain 
support among the voters. However he was not able to keep such consensus. In fact, his 
provocative idea to celebrate the ‘real workers’ day on the 1 May did not reach the agreement of 
public opinion, wielding a loss of votes. Hollande advantage grew even more after the TV 
debate, held on 2 May 2012. This day was said to be a crucial event of the campaign, and in fact 
we registered a huge number of tweets written during or immediately after the debate (among the 
66,200 tweets written on 2 May 2012, two third were comments to the debate). In line with other 
analyses our estimates confirm that Hollande has prevailed during the debate.24 Then, few days 
before the elections, the socialist candidate was safely leading. Finally, during the last day of 
campaign the centrist leader, Bayrou, granted his support to Hollande. His choice however seems 
to have pushed moderate voters to vote for Sarkozy reducing the gap between the two 
candidates. 
According to this analysis we illustrated how voting preferences expressed day-by-day on 
Twitter tend to react to exogenous events related to the agenda of the electoral campaign. 
Furthermore, the amount of preferences expressed in the last week before the elections enables 
us to correctly forecast the outcome of the polls, wielding predictions that are very close to those 
made by traditional surveys (see also: Larsson and Moe, 2012; Tjong Kim Sang and Bos, 2012). 
 
4. Electoral campaign and social media (2): the 2012 French Legislative elections 
  
We double checked the predictive skills of a social-media analysis by applying this 
technique to forecast the first round of the 2012 French Legislative election, held on 10 June 
2012. Compared to the previous case, this represents clearly an harder (and more ambitious) 
exercise, given the large number of parties competing in that election. We gathered in this 
respect 79,300 tweets released during the last week before the elections to predict the national 
share of votes of the main parties. As shown in Figure 3 below, at the national level, our 
prediction is once again close to the actual results. This is true for almost every party. In 
particular we made a very accurate forecast concerning UMP, Greens, minor moderate parties 
and, to a lesser extent, the Socialist Party. On the contrary, we overestimated far left parties 
(FdG, NPA and others) while the vote share of National Front has been underestimated. A 
possible explanation for misestimating the FN vote share is that far-right voters tend to be 
underrepresented on-line (this is particularly true for elder voters). In addition it can be that FN 
voters may be (more) reluctant to publicly express their voting behavior on-line. Similarly, left-
wing voters seem to be overrepresented in social networks and this aspect could have led to 
inaccurate prediction.25  
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That noted, on average the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) of our prediction remains quite 
low being equal to 2.38%, which is not far from those displayed by the surveys held during the 
last week before the elections. On average survey polls registered a MAE equal to 1.23%, 
ranging from 0.69% to 1.93%.  
 
Figure 3. Predicted and actual votes share related to the first round of the 2012 French 
Legislative elections. 
 
 
 
The data on the French Legislative election allow also us to explore a further point, linked 
to the possibility to assess the main sources of bias that may alter the accuracy of our prediction. 
To do that we use data about local constituencies. We exploited the geo-tagging service made 
available through Twitter to gather preferences within 13 local areas: Bordeaux, Djion, Le 
Havre, Lille, Lyon, Marseille, Montpellier, Nice, Rennes, Saint Etienne, Strasbourg, Toulouse, 
Toulon. Then we ran 13 analysis to get social-media prediction within each area and we 
compared such estimates with the actual results in the 46 local districts connected to those 
cities.26 We measured the MAE, which represents our dependent variable and varies between 
2.70 and 8.23. Then we tried to assess which elements increase or decrease the MAE of our 
prediction. We have estimated three different models. In the first one, we include our main 
independent variables: Number of Tweets, the number of comments released in each area, which 
expresses the information available, and Abstention, the percentage of district voters who 
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decided to abstain. In Model 2 we add three control variables: Le Pen Votes Share, the share of 
votes gained in the district by the far-right candidate during the 2012 Presidential elections (used 
to identify those areas where the extreme right is strongest); Mélenchon Votes Share, the share of 
votes gained in the district by the candidate of the Front de Gauche, during the 2012 Presidential 
elections (as a proxy for the ‘red’ districts), and Incumbent, a dummy variable equal to one when 
the incumbent MP is running to seek the re-election. Finally, in Model 3 we add the interaction 
term between Number of Tweets and Abstention, to assess whether the effect of having additional 
information about citizens’ preferences is conditional on the likelihood that citizens do actually 
cast a vote. Data have been analyzed through OLS regression. Table 2 reports the results. 
 
Table 2. OLS regression of Mean Absolute Error 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES    
      
Number of Tweets -0.000245** -0.000234** -0.004339*** 
  (0.000102) (0.000108) (0.001354) 
Abstention 0.121490** 0.116903* -0.227582* 
  (0.054625) (0.058571) (0.125282) 
Number of Tweets X Abstention - - 0.000091*** 
   (0.000030) 
Le Pen Votes Share - 0.012887 0.001895 
   (0.038121) (0.034903) 
Mélenchon Votes Share - -0.027611 -0.039590 
   (0.104928) (0.095634) 
Incumbent - -0.383584 -0.635201 
  (0.460141) (0.427129) 
Constant 1.028943 1.618636 17.68222 
  (2.506913) (2.828653) (5.880315) 
      
Observations 46 46 46 
R-squared 0.191 0.210 0.361 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
From Model 1 we observe that any growth of the information available on-line improves 
our predictive skills. For instance, an increase of 1,000 tweets analyzed lowers our error roughly 
by a quarter point. Conversely, the MAE is greater when the Abstention growths (the same 
concerns affects traditional off-line pre-electoral polls: see Crespi, 1988). This could happen 
because some citizens can easily express their opinion on-line though refusing to cast a vote 
(perhaps because they feel that their choice will not alter the results or because after all the act of 
voting is costly: Downs, 1957). Social-media analysis then seems less able to provide accurate 
predictions when voters tend to abstain at a higher rate (a 10% increase in Abstention raises 
MAE by 1.2 additional points), while the accuracy should be greater when forecasting elections 
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with a higher turnout. These two effects hold when adding some control variables (Model 2). 
Our prediction does not appear therefore biased by the stronger presence of FN or left-wing 
voters. While we know that incumbent candidates usually benefit from an advantage when 
seeking re-election (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002; Gelman and King, 1990), it has also been 
argued that elections are referenda on the incumbent (Freeman and Bleifuss, 2006) and these 
candidates may outperform in the pre-electoral surveys compared to the actual results, due to 
name recognition. However, Table 2 shows that this potential ‘incumbency effect’ does not 
damage our predictive skills. 
Finally, in Model 3, we tested the conditional effect of Number of Tweets and Abstention. 
The coefficient of the interaction term is significant. Accordingly, in Figure 4 we report the 
marginal effect of Number of Tweets as the level of Abstention increases. We also superimpose a 
histogram portraying the frequency distribution for Abstention (the scale for the distribution is 
given by the vertical axis on the left-hand side of the graph). Having more information on 
citizens’ voting preferences decreases the error only when the turnout rate is sufficiently high. 
Up to such threshold, our predictive skills are enhanced by any increase in the number of 
comments about voting intentions, and such effect enlarges as turnout growths. Conversely, 
when voters tend to abstain at a higher rate, having more information about their (declared) 
voting choice negatively affects the accuracy of our predictions: given that voters would express 
themselves on Twitter instead of casting a real vote, the Mean Absolute Error tends to increase. 
This (original) finding is quite interesting given that it clearly shows the strict relationship 
incurring between what happens on-line and off-line in terms of our ability to extract reliable 
measures from social-media analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4. Marginal effect of Number of Tweets on Mean Absolute Error 
(with 90% confidence interval) 
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Conclusions 
  
There has been a large discussion about the possibility for the web to become an 
‘uncoerced public sphere’, a potential source of direct democracy and mobilization, and how in 
general the development of social networks could contribute to increase responsiveness and 
accountability of real world politics. (Benkler, 2006; Gil de Zuniga et al., 2009; Papacharissi, 
2002; for a critic, refer to: Alvarez and Hall, 2011; Hilbert, 2009; Hindman, 2009; Larsson and 
Moe, 2012). A growing number of facts, discussed earlier, shows that this is not just an 
hypothetical scenario. Not surprisingly, in the last years we also assist a dramatically increase in 
the number of works that analyzes social networks in order to assess the opinions of internet 
users and to check whether the attitudes expressed on-line can be eventually used to forecast the 
voting behavior of the whole population of voters. For all these reasons, being able to rely on 
techniques apt to measure on-line public opinion becomes a pressing topic.  
In this paper we have applied in three (very) different political scenarios a statistical 
method recently introduced in the literature that performs an automated and supervised sentiment 
analysis on blogs and social networks, and that improves on traditional Sentiment Analysis 
wielding more accurate results. From the results of our empirical analyses, we can raise some 
general claims. First of all, despite internet users are not necessarily representative of the whole 
population of country’s citizens, our analysis shows, with only few exceptions, a consistent 
correlation between social-media results and the ones we could obtain from more traditional 
mass surveys as well as a remarkable ability of social-media to forecast on average electoral 
results (a so careful prediction that could not be due simple to chance) .  
This seems to be true for both “single issue” elections (such as Presidential race), in 
which the preference eventually expressed by an internet user involves only a positive or a 
negative evaluation among two single options, as well as for more difficult situations to forecast 
such as the ones in which internet users can choose to express a preference among a (large) 
number of different targets (such as political leaders or political parties). This – together with the 
fact that the political scenarios here analyzed come from two different countries (Italy and 
France) in which the socio-economic-political traits of internet-users are not supposed to be 
necessarily identical – is clearly important for the robustness of our results.  
Why does this happen? The direction of causality of this pattern (i.e., is the social media 
opinion the one that tends to become more similar to the average general public opinion as the 
usage of social networks increases in the large population, or, on the contrary, are social media 
as an all increasingly driving (or anticipating) the general public opinion?) lies beyond the scope 
of our research. But it is clearly a topic that deserves a further investigation. 
Besides this main result, the previous analyses also allow to provide some more fine-
grained conclusions. For example, sentiment analysis of social media seems to provide more 
accurate predictions when focusing on the most popular leaders or on mainstream parties. On the 
other side, the accuracy of predictions based on sentiment analysis for non-mainstream parties 
could be increased by developing an appropriate set of weights according to the political 
preferences of social media users (discounting, for example, the fact that in France supporters of 
far-right parties tend to be underrepresented on social networks compared to radical left-wing 
voters), provided this kind of information is available (and reliable). This represents a further 
topic that deserves to be explored. Secondly, on-line preferences tend to react to exogenous 
factors (i.e., news, political agenda, electoral campaign) as expected (Franch, 2012), and these 
reactions seem to be in line with those observed through mass-surveys.  
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Finally, some of the potential bias that arise from social-media analysis may be softened 
in the long run, as the usage of social networks increases: as we have shown, when a growing 
number of citizens’ express on-line their opinion and/or voting choice, the accuracy of social 
media analysis increases, provided internet-users act consistently on that (by, for example, 
confirming their (declared) on-line preference by casting a (real) vote). 
Summing up, despite the well-known limits and the troubles faced by social-media 
analysis (Gayo-Avello et al., 2011; Goldstein and Rainey, 2010), our results provide reasons to 
be optimistic about the capability of sentiment analysis to become (if not to be already) a useful 
supplement of traditional off-line polls. 
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Notes
                                                
1 Sentiment analysis consists in analyzing texts to extract information. Basic sentiment analysis 
allows to determine the attitude of the author measuring the polarity (negative or positive) of 
such sentiment with respect to one particular topic. 
2 Source: International Telecommunications Unions 
(http://www.itu.int/ITUD/ict/facts/2011/material/ICTFactsFigures2011.pdf). 
3 Source: Social Network around the World 2010 
(http://www.slideshare.net/stevenvanbelleghem/social-networks-around-the-world-2010). 
4 Source: http://www.internetworldstats.com/facebook.htm. 
5 Source: Wasserman, Todd. March 21, 2012. “Twitter Says It Has 140 Million Users” 
http://mashable.com/2012/03/21/twitter-has-140-million-users. 
6 For a more skeptical view on the role that social-media can play in organizing revolts, see 
Morozov (2009) with respect to protests related to the 2009 Iranian elections. 
7 During the EU elections held in 2009, the Pirate Party won 7.1% of votes in Sweden, gaining 1 
seats in the EU parliament. In Germany, it received 2% of votes in the 2009 German Federal 
Election. It subsequently obtained positive results in German regional elections. In Italy, the 
Movimento 5 Stelle also reported surprising results during local elections held between 2009 and 
2012, up to a point that survey polls published during September 2012 attribute to that party a 
striking 20% in the voting intention of Italian voters.  
8http://www.corriere.it/economia/12_maggio_02/appello-governo-ai-cittadini-segnalazioni-
sprechi-spending-review_9e5918c2-9438-11e1-ae3e-f83a8e51ff45.shtml. 
9http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2012/marzo/03/Laurea_via_alla_consultazione_online_co_9_12
0303011.shtml. 
10 A second (large) stream of research in the literature on social-media adopts a more “political 
supply-side” approach, analyzing how internet and the diffusion of social-media have affected 
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the content of the electoral campaigning and the political communication by candidates and 
parties. While some of the initial hope for e-democracy have been unfulfilled (Chadwick, 2008; 
Hilbert, 2009), internet still provides new opportunities linked with electoral campaign (Larsson 
and Moe, 2012; Smith, 2009) such that politicians can engage with the wider public (Gibson et 
al., 2008). 
11 For example, a sentence such as “what a nice rip-off!” could create a problem of classification 
for an ontological dictionary, given that it includes both a positive and a negative reference. 
However, for a human coder the meaning of the sentence (and its underlying attitude toward the 
subject of the sentence) is immediately evident. 
12 http://www.crimsonhexagon.com/quantitative-analysis/. From our replications, the root mean 
square error of the estimates drops until 1.5% when the number of hand-coded documents 
increases up to 500. 
13 Besides, while classic web analyses allow only distinguishing between positive and negative 
references to a particular topic, the HK can enable to measure the intensity of preferences (i.e., 
how much pro or con). In addition it can also allow to catch the motivations linked to people’s 
choice according to the variety of latent dimensions that emerge from the stream of voices 
available on the net. 
14 Source: Osservatorio Politico ISPO (Istituto per gli Studi sulla Pubblica Opinione). We thank 
ISPO for having shared the data. 
15 The population of tweets collected consists of all the tweets posted during the temporal-period 
considered (see below) that include in their text at least one of a set of keywords (generally the 
name of the political leaders/parties covered by each of our analysis in both Italy and France). 
16 Script and data are available upon request. 
17 Note however that internet ceases to be a free environment for political debate whenever users 
have to deal with censorship, like in authoritarian regimes (King et al., 2012). 
18 The ‘spiral of silence’ theory claims that individuals who perceive their opinion to be in the 
minority do not tend to express such opinion at all, thereby strengthening the relative support for 
(perceived) dominant views. 
19 It has also been noted that Internet tends to be dominated by a small number of heavy users 
that writes more, while many users make comments very seldom (Mustafaraj et al., 2011; 
Tumasjan et al., 2010). In addition, some accounts are fake (Metaxas and Mustafaraj, 2010) and 
social media allow manipulation by spammers and propagandists. Finally, and by definition, we 
can observe on-line only the opinion of those who have decided to express their attitudes (Gayo-
Avello et al., 2011). 
20 Gender constitutes a partial exception given that, despite equal participation to social 
networks, males tend to express their political views more than females do. 
21 The peak in MAE registered in April 2011 corresponds to a situation in which the information 
on leaders’ popularity from the Mass-Surveys covers just two Italian leaders out of eight (i.e., 
Berlusconi and Fini). If we eliminate this eccentric temporal observation, the average value of 
MAE over the period is less than eight points. 
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22 The Berlusconi IV cabinet was weakened by the split of the formateur party, People of 
Freedom (PDL), in 2010 (Ceron, 2011). After that, the ruling coalition composed by PDL and 
Northern League, was defeated during local elections and national referenda held in May and 
June 2011 (Marangoni, 2011). Such weakness, exacerbated by the economic crisis and the 
striking growth of public debt, jeopardized government stability paving the way for anticipated 
elections. Although members of the ruling coalition claimed for parliament dissolution after 
Berlusconi resignation, due to an escalation of the financial crisis, a majority of MPs surprisingly 
agreed on supporting a caretaker government led by the former EU commissioner, Mario Monti.  
23 For instance, Ipsos predicted his victory with 52.5% and TNS-Sofres with 53.5%. 
24 See http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/election-presidentielle-2012/20120502.OBS9654/sarkozy-
ou-hollande-qui-gagne-le-debat-l-analyse-sur-twitter.html. 
25 Alternatively, it could be that the far-left parties tend to be the ones more heavily affected by 
strategic voting by voters in the first round, so that a (radical) left-wing internet user expresses 
her sincere preference on-line, but not at the polls. Albeit in a run-off electoral system, such as 
the one applied in the French Legislative election, the incentives to vote strategically are stronger 
in the second round, they are not absent also in the first round (Cox, 1997). Note that such 
incentive to express a sincere vote on-line and then to vote differently does not exist by 
definition when we have just two parties/candidates running at the polls. This could also explain 
why our estimations for the second-round of the French Presidential election appear slightly 
better than the French legislative election case. 
26 We excluded Paris due to its broad size that makes it harder to establish a link between the 
origin of each post and the electoral districts existing in the city. 
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